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A RESPONSE TO "COCAINE BABIES"-AMENDMENT OF
FLORIDA'S CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LAWS TO
ENCOMPASS INFANTS BORN DRUG DEPENDENT
BRIAN C. SPITZER
W HILE children born with drugs in their system as a result of
maternal drug use is not new,' cocaine has only recently be-
come a significant part of the problem. One South Florida hospital
reported the birth of over 100 cocaine babies in 1986 alone.2 Yet,
until 1987, the Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS) did not allow its social workers to investigate such
cases because, state law did not recognize these children as abused
or neglected.3 A public health nurse might be sent to interview the
family and inspect the home environment, but a caseworker could
not be called in unless there was a finding of actual abuse or
neglect.4
In March 1987, this policy was changed: Hospital workers are
now required to immediately notify HRS whenever a baby is born
with drugs in its system.5 Within twenty-four hours of receiving
such a report, a public health nurse must visit and evaluate the
newborn's home environment.' Nevertheless, the public health
nurse would still need additional evidence that the child might be
abused or neglected before calling a caseworker, 7 leaving the stan-
dard for calling in a caseworker unchanged. During the 1987 Regu-
lar Session, however, the Florida Legislature passed Committee
Substitute for House Bill 155,8 amending the state's child abuse
and neglect laws to encompass children born drug dependent. A
1. Reports regarding the effects of fetal addiction to narcotics appeared in medical jour-
nals as early as 1892. D. HAWKINS, DRUGS AND PREGNANCY 145 (1983). One commentator
calculates that at least one in every 1,000 births in the United States involves a mother who
uses heroin or methadone. Zagon, Opiods and Development: New Lessons From Old
Problems, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH No. 60, at 59 (1985).
2. Miami Herald, Feb. 25, 1987, at 1BR, col. 2. Florida's Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services (HRS) does not currently compile statewide statistics showing how
many children are born to drug abusing mothers. Id. The problem may be growing as a
consequence of the spread of "crack" cocaine. "Crack" is the street name for small chunks
or rocks of freebase cocaine which has been extracted from cocaine powder in a simple,
inexpensive procedure. See Washton, Gold & Pottash, "Crack," 80 POSTGRAD. MED. 52
(1986) [hereinafter "Crack"].
3. Sun-Sentinel, Mar. 2, 1987, at 8A, col. 1.
4. Id. at 8A, col. 1-2.
5. Miami Herald, Feb. 26, 1987, at 1BR, col. 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Ch. 87-90, 1987 Fla. Laws 333 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.503(7)(a) (1985)).
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caseworker can now be called in immediately after HRS receives
such a report and child dependency proceedings can be initiated to
remove the child from parental custody.
In this Comment, the author begins by summarizing Florida's
child abuse and neglect laws, and then considers the status of un-
born children in Florida before the passage the new legislation. He
then assesses the scope of a pregnant woman's right to privacy,
and surveys the limitations other jurisdictions have imposed on
this right. Next, the author analyzes Committee Substitute for
House Bill 155. Finally, he evaluates failed legislation which would
have imposed criminal penalties for certain kinds of prenatal drug
use.
I. CURRENT FLORIDA LAW
Chapter 415' sets forth a statutory scheme designed to provide
comprehensive protective services for abused and neglected chil-
dren. Generally, it requires that such cases be reported to HRS
which must take appropriate action to prevent further harm.'0
More specifically, the current reporting provision mandates that
any person who knows of or suspects child abuse or neglect must
immediately report it to HRS. This duty extends, inter alia, to
teachers, health care providers, social workers, and day care work-
ers.'" Knowingly and willfully failing to report suspected abuse, or
preventing another from doing so constitutes a second degree
misdemeanor. 2
HRS is capable of receiving and investigating abuse and neglect
reports twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.' 3 Once a re-
port is received, a child protection investigation is commenced
within twenty-four hours, and must be completed within thirty
days.' 4 In each case, the investigation determines: (1) the composi-
tion of the family or household; (2) whether there is any evidence
of abuse or neglect; (3) the immediate and long-term risk of the
child's remaining in the existing home environment; and (4) what
protective services are necessary to ensure the child's well-being
and future development. 5 A report must be prepared indicating
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.502-.514 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
10. Id. § 415.502 (1985).
11. Id. § 415.504 (1)(a)-(f) (Supp. 1986).
12. Id. § 415.513(1) (1985).
13. Id. § 415.505(1)(a) (Supp. 1986).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 415.505(l)(b)(1)-(4).
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whether abuse or neglect was "indicated" or "unfounded." 6 The
findings are then transmitted to HRS' abuse registry.1 7 If a child is
in imminent danger, a law enforcement officer or authorized agent
of HRS may take the child into protective custody, with or without
parental consent. 18 Once in custody, the child will not be placed in
a shelter unless there is no parent, legal custodian, or other respon-
sible adult relative available to provide adequate supervision and
care.
1 9
The Florida Juvenile Justice Act,20 ("the Act") authorizes HRS,
a state attorney, or any other person to initiate child dependency
proceedings when there is evidence of abuse and neglect.2 1 The
Act's purpose is to assure that abused or neglected children receive
the care, guidance, and control which will best promote their wel-
fare, preferably at home.22 It seeks to preserve and strengthen fam-
ily ties whenever possible; a child will not be removed from paren-
tal custody unless that is the only way to safeguard the child's
welfare.2 3
Dependency proceedings begin with an adjudicatory hearing.24 If
the child is adjudged dependent, a disposition hearing is held to
determine what to do with the child.25 The court may place the
child under the protective supervision of HRS in the child's own
home, or in the home of a relative or other person.2 Alternatively,
the court may commit the child to the temporary custody of HRS
or a licensed child care agency.27 The court may also compel the
16. Id. § 415.504(4)(c). An "'[indicated report' means a report made pursuant to section
415.504 when a child protective investigation determines that some indication of abuse or
neglect exists." Id. § 415.503(8) (1985). An " '[u]nfounded report' means a report made pur-
suant to section 415.504 when an investigation determines that no indication of abuse or
neglect exists." Id. § 415.503(15).
17. Id. § 415.505(1)(f) (Supp. 1986).
18. Id. § 415.506 (1985).
19. Id. § 39.402(1)(a)-(b)(1985).
20. Id. §§ 39.001-.415 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
21. Id. § 39.404(1) (1985).
22. Id. § 39.001(2)(b).
23. Id. § 39.001(2)(c).
24. Id. § 39.408(2)(a)-(c). The adjudicatory hearing follows an initial arraignment hear-
ing provided for by section 39.408(1). For a detailed review of Florida's juvenile dependency
law see Reno & Smart, Dealing with Child Abuse and Neglect: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint, 8
NOVA L.J. 271, 285-89 (1984). See also Bell, Dependency Law in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 652
(1979).
25. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(3) (1985).
26. Id. § 39.41(1)(a) (Supp. 1986).
27. Id. § 39.41(1)(c)-(d).
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natural parents or legal guardian of a child to receive counseling.2 8
The court may retain jurisdiction to subsequently change the
child's custody status.2 9 It can also permanently commit a depen-
dent child to HRS or a licensed child-placing agency for adoption
based on a finding that it is in the best interests of the child to do
so.80 However, since permanent commitment severs both parental
rights and the court's jurisdiction over the child, it is usually a last
resort:
The permanent loss of custody of a child is a far more severe rem-
edy than any other available in dependency proceedings and, in-
deed, it is one of the most severe decisions courts can make. Since
it is such an extreme remedy, courts will usually first attempt
other remedies including treatment, counseling, protective super-
vision and foster care. They will use performance agreements to
attempt to push the parents or custodian into providing a proper
setting for the child. When all else fails, and the prospect for
abuse and neglect continues, the court must consider permanent
commitment proceedings. 1
Chapter 4152 defines an "[a]bused or neglected child" as "a
child whose physical or mental health or welfare is harmed, or
threatened with harm, by the acts or omissions of the parent or
other person responsible for the child's welfare."33 Child abuse or
neglect is "harm or threatened harm to a child's physical or mental
health or welfare."3 Such "harm" can occur when the person re-
sponsible for the child's welfare acts or fails to act in certain speci-
fied ways.35 Significantly, a "child" is defined as "any person under
28. Id. § 39.41(7).
29. Id. § 39.41(1)(e).
30. Id. § 39.41(1)(f).
31. Reno & Smart, supra note 24, at 292.
32. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.502-.514 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
33. Id. § 415.503(1) (1985).
34. Id. § 415.503(3).
35. Id. § 415.503(7)(a)-(f). "Harms" to the child include injury sustained as a result of
excessive corporal punishment, sexual battery, sexual abuse, exploitation, abandonment,
failure to provide supervision or guardianship, and failure to supply adequate food, clothing,
shelter or health care. Id.
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the age of 18 years." 6 Thus the statutory scheme expressly ex-
cludes the unborn from its coverage.37
Relying on well-established common law principles, the courts
have consistently held that criminal laws prohibiting certain acts
against "human beings" do not authorize prosecutions predicted
on acts committed against fetuses.3 8 For example, in State v. Gon-
zalez,"' the state appealed the dismissal of manslaughter and ag-
gravated battery charges against a medical doctor for allegedly per-
forming an illegal abortion on a minor. The Third District Court of
Appeal framed the issue as "whether a fetus is a human being
within the meaning of the Florida manslaughter statute. '40 In af-
firming the dismissal, the court held to the common law rule that
the killing of a fetus is not homicide unless the child is born alive
and then dies from injuries previously sustained. The court held
that "[s]ince 'human being' is not defined in Florida Statutes and
until the Florida Legislature specifically changes it, the common
law definition controls." 41 Likewise, the court in State v. McCall42
held that the term "human being" does not include a viable, full-
term fetus in the process of being born. While acknowledging that
the common law rule may be archaic, the court refused to alter it
because "substantive changes in long-standing common law rules
are best left to the legislature. '43
In the civil context, Florida courts have repeatedly held that un-
born children are not "persons" for purposes of recovery under the
36. Id. § 415.503(2). A "child" for purposes of the criminal child abuse statute is "any
person under the age of 18 years." FLA. STAT. § 827.01(1)(1985).
37. Section 1.01(3) defines "person" to include "individuals, children, firms, associations,
joint adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corpo-
rations, and all other groups or combinations." Id.
38. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87
Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970) (scholarly discussion of the common law rule and its historical
development).
39. 467 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for review denied, 476 So. 2d 67 (Fla.
1985). Florida does have a feticide statute providing that "the willful killing of an unborn,
quick child by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted
in the death of such mother shall be deemed manslaughter." FLA. STAT. § 782.09 (1985).
40. Gonzalez, 467 So. 2d at 725.
41. Id. at 726.
42. 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
43. Id. at 877. Accord People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v.
Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal denied, 417 Mich. 1006, 334
N.W.2d 616 (1983); State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); Keeler v.
Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
Contra Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (a fetus is a human
being for purposes of the vehicular homicide statute).
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wrongful death statute. In Stern v. Miller,44 the parents of a seven-
month-old fetus involved in an automobile accident brought a
wrongful death action when the child was subsequently stillborn.45
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that the majority of juris-
dictions permit wrongful death actions when a child is stillborn as
a result of tortious prenatal injury,"' but it nevertheless refused to
do so. The court predicated its refusal on legislative intent, noting
that when Florida's lawmakers enacted the Wrongful Death Act, 7
they "had the opportunity to further define the meaning of the
term 'person' [to include the unborn] and chose not to do so.""' In
Duncan v. Flynn," the supreme court reaffirmed its decision in
Stern, adding that for the purposes of the Wrongful Death Act, a
child is not "born alive" until he or she acquires an existence sepa-
rate from the mother.
The case law is clear: The legal conception of "person" does not
include a fetus. Thus, it appears that the state's prior child abuse
and neglect laws excluded children born addicted to drugs or oth-
erwise harmed as a result of the mother's prenatal drug use be-
cause the conduct producing the adverse consequences occurred
before birth. Indeed, in an informal opinion issued on December
13, 1986, the Attorney General concluded that
unless and until legislatively amended or judicially determined
otherwise, I am of the view that the existing definitions of terms
contained in [section 415.503] operate to preclude a child born
addicted to drugs from being considered a victim of 'child abuse
or neglect' for purposes of [sections 415.502-.514] .5
44. 348 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 1977).
45. Id. Florida's Wronful Death Act provides a cause of action "[when the death of a
person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of warranty . FLA.
STAT. § 768.19 (1985).
46. 348 So. 2d at 305-06. See also W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370 n.32 (5th ed. 1984).
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1985).
48. 348 So. 2d at 307. In Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 213 So. 2d 695
(Fla. 1968), the supreme court was called upon to determine whether parents could recover
under the Wrongful Death of Minors Act when a fetus was stillborn as a result of prenatal
injuries caused by another's negligence. The court held that "a right of action ... can only
arise after the live birth and subsequent death of the child." Id. at 700. Presumptively
aware of this decision, the legislature declined to redefine the word "person" when it passed
a modified Wrongful Death Act in 1972.
49. 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978).
50. Informal Attorney General Opinion issued to Representative Lippman on Dec. 18,
1986, at 3-4 (on file, Florida State University Law Review). Preliminarily, the Attorney
General noted:
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This interpretation is consistent with a prior administrative con-
struction applied by HRS. 1 On March 9, 1987, however, HRS Sec-
retary Gregory Coler instituted a statewide policy requiring the de-
partment to be notified immediately whenever a baby is born drug
dependent.2 Legally, this new policy was problematic; at that time
infant drug dependency did not constitute child abuse or neglect.
Consequently it was unclear whether HRS possessed the statutory
authority to require and receive such reports, much less conduct
protective service investigations.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
When attempting to protect the health and welfare of children,
lawmakers must be conscious of the parents' constitutional right of
privacy. The inalienable right of the people to enjoy privacy and
personal autonomy within the law is deeply rooted in Anglo-Amer-
ican jurisprudence, indeed
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the posses-
sion and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference of others .... The right to one's person may be said to be
a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.""3
The Court has held that this constitutional guarantee restricts the
scope of legislative prerogative, protecting individuals from unwar-
The administrative construction of a statute by the agency charged with its ad-
ministration is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous (citations omitted).
Additionally, a court reviewing such an agency construction must defer to the agency's
interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legisla-
tive intent and is supported by substantial, competent evidence.
Id. at 1-2 (citations omitted).
51. Fla. H.R., Comm. on HRS, Subcomm. on Social, Eco. & Dev. Servs., tape recording
of proceedings (Apr. 15, 1987) (on file with committee) [hereinafter Subcomm. Tape].
52. See supra notes 5-7, and accompanying text.
53. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). The United States Su-
preme Court has consistently rejected state legislative enactments that impermissibly bur-
den this time-honored right. Eistentadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking statute that
denied contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(striking statute forbidding the use of contraceptives even by married couples, and prohibit-
ing counselling others in their use); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking stat-
ute requiring compulsory sterilization of certain felons); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (striking statute requiring children to attend public schools); see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages
to young children).
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ranted governmental intrusion in matters of marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, childrearing and education."'
In Roe v. Wade,55 the Court held that the right to privacy im-
posed definite limits on legislation which interfere with a woman's
freedom to control her own pregnancy. It reasoned that the Four-
teenth Amendment applied to "persons," which does not encom-
pass the unborn. The Court attempted to balance a woman's right
to control her pregnancy against the state's interest in protecting
potential life. It recognized an "important and legitimate [state]
interest in potential life," which becomes compelling when the fe-
tus reaches viability."' A state may act as to proscribe terminating
a viable fetus "except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother. 5 7 In Roe's wake, many jurisdictions have ac-
ted to protect viable fetal life.58
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Dependency actions predicated on a newborn's drug addiction
have frequently succeeded. In the Michigan case of In re Baby X,19
the court found sufficient evidence of neglect to take temporary
custody of an infant that began exhibiting symptoms of withdrawal
within twenty-four hours of birth. On appeal, the mother con-
tended that prenatal conduct could not constitute neglect or abuse
under Michigan's Probate Code and, therefore, the court lacked ju-
54. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
713 (1976)). See generally Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Inter-
vene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. Id. at 163.
57. Id. at 163-64. The Court did note that most states recognize the legal "personhood"
of the unborn under certain limited circumstances. Id. at 161. The common law right of
action for prenatal injuries was first recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp 138 (D.D.C.
1946). At common law the killing of a viable fetus was a misdemeanor; harming a fetus did
not constitute murder unless the child was born alive and subsequently died from prenatal
injuries. Myers, supra note 56, at 10. Only the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
rejected this view and held that a fetus is a "person" for purposes of that state's vehicular
homicide statute. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E. 2d 1324 (1984). See
generally Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Woman's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
58. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 247 S.E.2d 457 (1981)
(pregnant woman who objected to surgery on religious grounds judicially compelled to un-
dergo a cesarean section to assure the survival of her unborn child). But see In re Steven S.,
126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (juvenile court that ordered a pregnant
mother detained to protect her unborn child when she was certified to receive intensive
psychiatric treatment reversed because a fetus is not within the ambit of the abuse and
neglect statutes which authorizes dependency proceedings).
59. 97 Mich. App. 111, 113, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1980).
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risdiction. While it agreed that the statute did not apply to the
unborn, the court of appeals nevertheless upheld the lower court
by employing some judicial sleight of hand: "Since Baby X was
born before the instant petition was filed .... this aspect of juris-
diction is not properly at issue. The prenatal period is only perti-
nent because it is the sole asserted basis for establishing jurisdic-
tion based on neglect." 60 The court held that "a newborn suffering
narcotics withdrawal symptoms as a consequence of prenatal ma-
ternal drug addiction may properly be considered a neglected
child.""1
The New York case of In re Male R 62 involved a drug depen-
dent infant whose mother never actually had physical custody. The
court ruled nonetheless that the child was neglected. It held that
the mother's addiction to prescription drugs rendered her unable
to care for the infant, thereby placing the child in imminent dan-
ger of neglect.6 3 In In re Smith," however, the court went a step
further. It ruled that evidence of a mother's refusal to seek treat-
ment for her alcohol abuse or to seek proper medical care for the
unborn child was "sufficient to establish an 'imminent danger' of
impairment of physical condition, including the possibility of fetal
alcohol syndrome, to the unborn child," and therefore the child
was "neglected." Most significantly, the court held that an unborn
child is a "person" under New York's abuse and neglect state.6 5
An Ohio court reached the same result in In re Ruiz. 6 Nora
Ruiz was an admitted heroin addict. She used the narcotic
throughout the last two weeks of her pregnancy, which terminated
in a premature delivery. Baby Ruiz' urine subsequently tested pos-
itive for cocaine and heroin. The court held that a viable fetus is a
"child" under the Ohio abuse statute, relying on the state's com-
60. Id. at 114-15, 293 N.W.2d at 738. The court did not decide whether such conduct
justified depriving the mother of custody.
61. Id. at 116, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
62. 102 Misc. 2d 1, 2, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819, 820 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1979).
63. Id. at 6, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 823. New York statutorily provides that a child who is
placed in imminent danger as a result of his parents' drug use is a neglected child. See infra
note 77 and accompanying text. Significantly, the mother refused to enroll in a drug treat-
ment program to overcome her barbituate addiction even after her newborn began suffering
withdrawal. The court declined to decide whether an adjudication of neglect could be based
solely upon prenatal maternal conduct. In re Male R., 102 Misc. 2d at 6, N.Y.S. 2d at 823.
64. 128 Misc. 2d 976, 979, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (N.Y. Fain. Ct 1985). See also In re
Vanessa F., 76 Misc. 2d 617, 619, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1974) ("[a] newborn
having withdrawal symptoms is prima facie a neglected baby .....
65. 128 Misc. 2d at 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
66. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 33, 500 N.E.2d 935, 936 (1986).
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pelling interest in protecting viable potential life. The court rea-
soned that by using heroin so late in her pregnancy, Ruiz had cre-
ated "a substantial risk to the health" of her baby. 7
Several states have child abuse and neglect statutes which ar-
guably provide protection for infants adversely affected by their
mothers' prenatal drug abuse. For example, a New Jersey statute
provides that:
Whenever it shall appear that any child within this State is of
such circumstances that his welfare will be endangered unless
proper care or custody is provided, an application . . . may be
filed... seeking that the Bureau of Childrens Services accept and
provide such care or custody of such child as the circumstances
may require .... The provisions of this section shall be deemed
to include an application on behalf of an unborn child.""8
This statute proports to give courts jurisdiction over pregnant
women whose conduct endangers the welfare of their unborn fe-
tuses. It is an extremely broad provision which arguably encom-
passes not only prenatal drug use but many forms of other conduct
as well: performing hazardous work; using legal drugs such as alco-
hol, caffeine or nicotine; and possibly even sexual practices which
pose a threat of harm to the unborn child.
New York's child neglect statute, on the other hand, is more nar-
rowly drawn, citing specific kinds of prohibited conduct:
"Neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age
(1) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been im-
paired ... as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a
minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper
supervision or guardianship, . . . by misusing a drug or drugs...
to the extent that he loses self control of his actions; or by any
other acts of a similar serious nature requiring the aid of the
court.6 9
67. Id. See also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1986):
No person who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or con-
trol, or person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen years of age or a mentally
or physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, shall create a sub-
stantial risk to health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection
or support.
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981) (emphasis added).
69. N.Y. JUD. FAM. CT. AcT § 1012(f) (McKinney 1983) (emphasis added).
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It focuses upon the parents' capacity as caregivers rather than
upon the child's condition. This statute appears to authorize child
dependency proceedings in cases of parental drug use even where
the child is born drug free, or where older children are involved.
Massachusetts has a reporting provision which is similar to the
new Florida legislation. The Commonwealth's statute requires a
child abuse report whenever a child "is suffering physical or emo-
tional injury resulting from abuse inflicted upon him including sex-
ual abuse, or from neglect, including malnutrition, or who is deter-
mined to be physically dependent upon an addictive drug at
birth. "70 Like Florida's new law, this statute avoids granting con-
stitutionally questionable legal rights to the unborn. Instead, it fo-
cuses solely upon the child's condition at birth, and unlike the
analogous New York and New Jersey laws, it expressly refers to
the child's physical addiction.
IV. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATION
House Bill 155 was prefiled by Representative Lippman71 on
February 2, 1987.72 On March 4, 1987, Senator Weinstein73 prefiled
Senate Bill 323, the companion to House Bill 155.71 As originally
filed, House Bill 155 expanded the meaning of "harm" constituting
"child abuse or neglect" for the purpose of providing protective
services to include "[ilnjury sustained by a newborn infant as a
result of being born [drug] dependent. ' 75 The specific drugs on
which a newborn's drug dependency constitutes abuse or neglect
are listed in Schedules I & II of the Florida Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 76 Cocaine, cannabis, lysergic
acid diethylamide, morphine, and heroin are among the better
known drugs listed. 77 Under this legislation, a newborn's depen-
dency on any drug listed in the two schedules would not be consid-
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
71. Dem., Hollywood.
72. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 42, HB 155.
73. Dem., Coral Gables.
74. FLA. LEGIs., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 84, SB 323. Since the House version ultimately passed, this Comment refers only to
House Bill 155.
75. Fla. HB 155 (1987).
76. Ch. 87-90, 1987 Fla. Laws 333 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.503(7)(a) (1985)). The
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act is found at FLA. STAT. ch.
893 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
77. See FLA. STAT. § 893.03(1)-(2) (Supp. 1986) (full list of prohibited drugs).
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ered child abuse or neglect if the drugs were administered pursu-
ant to a detoxification program or any other medically approved
treatment modality.7
A. Legislative History of House Bill 155
House Bill 155 was initially referred to the House Committee on
Health and Rehabilitative Services,79 which in turn sent the bill to
the Subcommittee on Social, Economic and Developmental Ser-
vices.80 Major changes occurred in Subcommittee at the behest of
several groups concerned about pregnant womens' right to privacy,
including the Florida American Civil Liberties Union, the Florida
Women's Political Caucus, and the Florida Coalition for Choice.81
Representative Lippman prepared two substantive amendments,
which were introduced in Subcommittee by Representative Jen-
nings. 2 The amendments were incorporated and the bill was favor-
ably passed on to the full committee.83 The House Committee on
Health and Rehabilitative Services reported House Bill 155 favora-
bly as a Committee Substitute. 4 The Committee Substitute for
House Bill 155 was then passed unanimously by the House of Rep-
resentatives without revision. The following day it was unani-
mously passed by the Senate, while the Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 323 was tabled.8 The new legislation was signed into
law by the Governor on June 18 1987. It became effective on Octo-
ber 1, 1987.7
1. Amendment #1
The first amendment adopted in Subcommittee made the
"[p]hysical dependency of a newborn infant upon any drug,"8 8
78. Ch. 87-90, 1987 Fla. Laws 333. "Detoxification" is defined as "the administering of
drugs under medical supervision in decreasing doses, pursuant to federal permit, to reach a
drug-free state." FLA. STAT. § 397.021(4) (1985).
79. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 42, HB 155.
80. Id.
81. See Subcomm. Tape, supra note 51.
82. Repub., Sarasota. See Subcomm. Tape, supra note 51. A title amendment was also
introduced. Id.
83. Id.
84. Fla. H.R. Comm. on HRS, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 22, 1987) (on file with
committee).
85. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 581 (Reg. Sess. May 26, 1987).
86. FLA. S. JOUR. 447 (Reg. Sess. May 27, 1987).
87. Ch. 87-90, 1987 Fla. Laws 333.
88. Id.
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rather than "injury sustained by a newborn infant as a result of
being born drug dependent" part of the definition of "harm" con-
stituting "child abuse or neglect.""9 The introduction of the
amendment addressed concerns that the "injury sustained" lan-
guage, by suggesting that fetuses are capable of receiving injuries,
would redefine the term "child" under Florida's abuse and neglect
statutes to include the unborn. 0 By focusing solely on the new-
born's condition, rather than acts affecting the fetus generally, the
amended language avoids any unintended granting of legal status
to the unborn and thereby impermissibly invading "the constitu-
tional protection a woman has in deciding what to do about a
pregnancy.""
2. Criminal Prosecution and Amendment #2
The most controversial feature of the original House Bill 155 was
that it authorized criminal prosecution of a mother who gives birth
to a drug dependent child.92 Under existing law, upon receiving a
report alleging that a child has received an observable injury or
medically diagnosed internal injury, HRS will determine whether
the cause was abuse or neglect.93 If HRS determines that a re-
ported injury did occur as the result of abuse or neglect, it must
make an oral, and then a written report to the state attorney and
the appropriate law enforcement agency. When it receives oral no-
tification, the law enforcement agency may begin a criminal inves-
tigation. If so, its findings must be reported to the state attorney.
HRS can also request a criminal investigation when the depart-
ment deems it appropriate. 4
Under early versions of House Bill 155, however, a finding that a
newborn is drug dependent would have required HRS to automati-
cally notify the state attorney and the appropriate law enforce-
ment agency, thereby producing a criminal investigation which
could culminate in criminal charges against the mother. 5
Lawmakers' concern with this eventuality lead to the introduction
89. Fla. HB 155 (1987).
90. Subcomm. Tape, supra note 51 (amendment 1 to HB 155 (1987)).
91. Florida Today, Apr. 16, 1987, at 2B, col. 2 (comments from lobbyist Charlene
Carres).
92. Subcomm. Tape, supra note 51.
93. FLA. STAT. § 415.505(1)(9) (Supp. 1986).
94. Id. § 415.505(3).
95. See FLA. STAT. § 415.505(g) (Supp. 1986). Of course, a mother cannot be prosecuted
for her "status" as a drug addict, but rather for inflicting harm on her unborn child by
exposing it to addictive drugs. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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of a second amendment which provided "that no parent of [a drug
dependent] newborn infant shall be subject to criminal investiga-
tion solely on the basis of such infant's drug dependency." 6 As
Representative Lippman explained in Subcommittee, "there was a
well-founded anxiety that we were looking to arrest moms. We are
not looking to do that,"97 but "to intervene ... [to] try to bring the
family back together."9' 8 Undoubtedly, this basic change made
House Bill 155 far more palatable to many legislators.
B. Constitutionality
Under Roe v. Wade, the state has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting a viable fetus." Arguably, the new legislation constitution-
ally protects Florida's interest in drug-free infants by focusing
solely upon the newborn's drug dependency. Medically, for a new-
born to be born drug dependent, the mother must have heavily
abused a physically addictive drug well into the final weeks of her
pregnancy. For example, if a woman who uses heroin stops taking
the drug more than two weeks before delivery, the newborn will
not suffer from withdrawal. 100 With drugs that do not create physi-
cal dependency, such as cocaine, the substance will not be present
in the newborn's system unless the mother has used it within
twenty-four hours prior to delivery. Since the mother's drug use
would have to continue into the last month of pregnancy, after the
fetus becomes viable, Florida's interest may indeed be compel-
ling. 101 While Committee Substitute for House Bill 155 does in-
96. Ch. 87-90, 1987 Fla. Laws 333 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.503(7)(a) (1985)).
97. Subcomm. Tape, supra note 53.
98. Id.
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
100. With heroin, an addictive narcotic "withdrawal reactions do not occur in the new-
born infant unless the mother has taken the drug consistently, the last dose being taken less
than a week prior to the birth of the child." Steg, Narcotic Withdrawal Reactions in the
Newborn, 211 J. AM. ASS'N DISEASES OF CHILD. 286, 287 (1958). The typical symptoms of a
newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal include continuous crying, irritability, impaired re-
flexes and motor skills, hyperactivity, vomiting and concomitant weight loss. In particularly
"severe cases, generalized convulsions occur and may be repeated." Id.
101. Cocaine abuse by pregnant women significantly reduces birth weight, increases the
stillbirth rate, and is associated with an increased congenital malformation rate. Bingol,
Fuchs, Diaz, Stone, & Gromisch, Teratogenicity of Cocaine in Humans, 110 J. PED. 93, 96
(1987). See also Chasnoff, Burns, Schnoll, & Burns, Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw.
ENG. J. MED. 666 (1985). Cocaine, however, is not a physically addictive drug, and so a new-
born must have been exposed to cocaine immediately prior to birth to exhibit cocaine-re-
lated symptoms. See generally "Crack," supra note 2. While apparently only children born
"drug dependent" are covered, it appears that the legislation protects children born with
nonaddictive drugs in their system as well. Since schedules I & II of section 893.03 include
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fringe upon a pregnant women's right to privacy, the legislators ap-
parently concluded that such privacy rights are outweighed by the
state's compelling interest in protecting drug dependent infants.10 2
C. Shortcomings
The new legislation does not consider a drug dependent newborn
abused or neglected when the child's dependency results from the
mother's use of drugs administered in conjunction with a detoxifi-
cation program or medically approved drug treatment.' 3 These
omissions may subject the legislation to an equal protection chal-
lenge on the grounds that there is no rational basis for classifying a
newborn's drug dependency according to the manner in which his
mother obtained the drugs or whether usage of the drug is per se
illegal. Many drugs on which a newborn's dependency would not
constitute abuse or neglect are as dangerous as the ones that do.
For example, methadone, a synthetic opiate administered to ad-
dicts in detoxification programs, produces more violent withdrawal
symptoms in newborns than heroin.' 0 ' Furthermore, alcohol abuse
is not addressed even though fetal alcohol syndrome causes severe
many nonphysically addictive drugs, the specific prohibition of the child's "dependency"
upon any drugs listed in those schedules shows that the legislation employs that term in a
nontechnical sense. Traditionally, legislators have been extremely imprecise in their use of
drug terminology. In fact, over half the states and Congress still incorrectly classify cocaine
as a "narcotic." See Schultz, Statutory Classification of Cocaine as a Narcotic: An Illogical
Anachronism, 9 AM. J. LAW. MED. 225 (1983).
102. In addition to federal guarantees, Floridians' right to privacy is protected by article
I, section 23 of the state constitution. It has been stated that section 23 provides a privacy
right much broader in scope than that afforded by the United States Constitution. See Win-
field v. Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (1985). Nevertheless, the
Florida Constitution does not confer a right so broad as to invalidate legislation which
"serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least
intrusive means." Id. at 547. While there is as yet no definitive case law on this issue, a
statute which does not run afoul of the Roe decision would presumably pass muster under
Florida's privacy clause as well.
103. Ch. 87-90, 1987 Fla. Laws 333 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.503(7)(a)(198 5 )).
104. Rajegowda, Glass, Evans, Graciella, Maso, Swartz, & Leblanc, Methadone With-
drawal in Newborn Infants, 81 J. PED. 532, 533 (1972) ("Methadone . . . is not only addic-
tive to the fetus, but is associated with a higher incidence and more prolonged duration of
withdrawal symptoms than that observed among newborn infants of heroin addicts."). See
also Zelson, Lee, & Casalino, Comparative Effects of Maternal Intake of Heroin and Meth-
adone, 289 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1216, 1218 (1973) ("Our observations demonstrate that the
ingestion of methadone during pregnancy, whether taken throughout the pregnancy or for
short periods at intervals during pregnancy, affects the unborn child, and will produce a
more severe withdrawal syndrome in the newborn infant than is usually seen in infants born
to heroin-addicted mothers.").
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and permanent damage and is the most common form of depen-
dency afflicting both mothers and infants.10 5
It can be argued, however, that ingesting alcohol or drugs admin-
istered in conjunction with a detoxification program or other medi-
cally approved treatment procedures are legal acts. In other words,
the rational basis for exempting fetal alcohol syndrome and certain
drug dependencies from the legislation's coverage lies in the fact
that the harm to the newborn did not result from criminal behav-
ior by the mother. Nevertheless, this contention is contrary to the
public policy behind Florida's abuse and neglect provisions: protec-
tion of the child's health and welfare. Focusing solely upon the
child's health and welfare, there seems little reason to distinguish
between the origins of the harm.
V. OTHER LEGISLATION-CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
While criminally prosecuting a woman who gives birth to a drug
dependent child was a realistic possibility under the unamended
version of House Bill 155, it remained unclear which statutory pro-
vision would authorize such action. Chapter 827 provides criminal
penalties for the abuse of children as well as adults.10 6 "Aggravated
child abuse," a second degree felony, is defined as one or more acts
committed by a person who: (a) commits aggravated battery on a
child; (b) willfully tortures a child; (c) maliciously punishes a child;
or (d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child. ' 10 7 For the purposes
of this chapter, "child" is defined as "any person under the age of
18 years."108 Since this definition of "child" has already been inter-
preted to exclude the unborn,109 giving birth to a drug dependent
child probably does not constitute aggravated child abuse as the
harm to the child occurred before it was born.
One of the few reported examples of such a prosecution is the
California case of Reyes v. Superior Court."l ° Margaret Reyes was
a heroin addict who continued to use the narcotic during her preg-
nancy. She was warned by a public health nurse that if she failed
105. "The abnormalities most typically associated with alcohol teratogenicity ... [are]
central nervous system dysfunction; a characteristic cluster of a facial abnormalities; and
variable major and minor malformations." Clarren & Smith, The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome,
298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1063 (1978).
106. FLA. STAT. §§ 827.01-.071 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
107. Id. § 827.03(1) (1985).
108. Id. § 827.01(1).
109. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
110. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
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to seek prenatal medical care, her child's health would be endan-
gered. She did not do so, and continued to use heroin during the
last month of her pregnancy. Reyes gave birth to twin boys, both
of whom were addicted to heroin, and suffered from withdrawal.
She was subsequently charged with two counts of felony child en-
dangering. Not surprisingly, the appellate court held that the
crime of child endangering "was not intended to apply to conduct
endangering an unborn child," and ordered the case dismissed."'
Criminally prosecuting mothers who give birth to drug depen-
dent babies conflicts with the public policy underlying Florida's
child welfare laws. The Florida Legislature's paramount concern in
providing comprehensive protective services for abused and ne-
glected children is "to preserve the family life of the parents and
children, to the maximum extent possible, by enhancing the paren-
tal capacity for adequate child care. 11 2 Criminal prosecution
would needlessly destroy the family by incarcerating the child's
mother when alternative measures could both protect the child
and stabilize the family.
Potential criminal liability would also encourage addicted
women to terminate or conceal their pregnancies. For example, to
avoid being reported by medical personnel, who would have a stat-
utory duty to do so, a pregnant addict might refrain from ob-
taining proper prenatal and postnatal care."13 She might even de-
liver without medical assistance, thereby risking injury and death
to both herself and the child. Finally, fear of prosecution could de-
ter pregnant drug abusers from seeking treatment for drug
problems. 114
A. House Bill 536
House Bill 536 would have criminalized the birth of a drug de-
pendent newborn. The bill was prefiled by Representative Gar-
cia" 5 on March 16, 1987,"11 and referred to the House Committee
on Health and Rehabilitative Services, where it died without de-
111. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
112. FLA. STAT. § 415.502 (1985).
113. Fla. Dept. of HRS, HB 536 (1987) Staff Analysis 3 (Apr. 7, 1987) (on file, Florida
State University Law Review) [hereinafter Staff Analysis].
114. Id. at 4.
115. Rep., Hialeah.
116. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 142-143, HB 536.
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bate.117 House Bill 536 provided numerous amendments to chapter
827, including an amendment defining a child as "any person
under the age of 18 years, including a newborn infant.""18 The leg-
islation proposed to amend the definition of torture to encompass
"every act, omission, or neglect whereby a person knowingly causes
a child unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering." 1 9 The bill
would also have redefined aggravated battery as "every act, or
omission, or neglect whereby a person knowingly causes a child
great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement. "120
Most significantly, House Bill 536 incorporated two presump-
tions regarding aggravated child abuse. The first presumption pro-
vided that "[i]f the child suffers death, great bodily harm, perma-
nent disability, or permanent disfigurement caused by the parent's
unlawful use of any substance controlled by section 893.03, regard-
less of when such unlawful use occurred, this shall be prima facie
evidence of committing aggravated battery on the child.' 21 The
second presumption provided that "[i]f the child suffers unneces-
sary or unjustifiable pain or suffering caused by the parent's un-
lawful use of any substance controlled by section 893.03, this re-
gardless of when such unlawful use occurred, shall be prima facie
evidence of torturing the child.' 1 22
House Bill 536 was internally inconsistent, overbroad, and prob-
ably unconstitutional. Poor drafting and the amendment to House
Bill 155, which precluded criminally investigating the mothers of
drug dependent babies, doomed it to failure. The first problem
with House Bill 536 concerned its redefinition of "child" to include
"a newborn infant." This would do nothing to extend the protec-
tion of chapter 827 to the unborn: the drug dependency of an in-
fant occurs before its birth, thus House Bill 536 arguably would
have failed to criminalize behavior which rendered an infant drug
dependent. A second difficulty arose from its extremely broad cov-
erage. The legislation addressed death, great bodily harm, perma-
nent disability, and unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering
by the child as a result of his parents' drug use. Except for the
child's drug dependency, which is easily verified with urinalysis
117. Id.
118. Fla. HB 536 (1987).
119. Id. (emphasis added).




and blood tests, it would be extremely difficult to prove a direct
causal relationship between the mother's drug use and the child's
condition at birth. According to HRS' own analysis, the use of legal
medication or substances during pregnancy could cause the same
or similar conditions in the child as the use of illegal substances
controlled in section 893.03.123 Moreover, the bill presumed abuse
from parental drug use "regardless of when such unlawful use oc-
curred ... "4 This language is excessively broad, applying not
only to newborns, but also to older children who may have medical
or emotional problems resulting from their parents' past drug use.
Finally, the statutory presumptions which House Bill 536 would
have added to the definitions of "aggravated battery" and "tor-
ture" are most probably unconstitutional. Under House Bill 536's
definitions, a person must "knowingly" commit aggravated battery
or torture.125 The bill also provided that the infliction of an enu-
merated harm to the newborn "shall be prima facie evidence" of
committing the prohibited act.126 By employing the phrase "shall
be prima facie evidence," the provision creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption, requiring the jury to presume the defendant's "knowl-
edge" unless the defendant produced evidence rebutting that pre-
sumption. 2 7  This presumption is probably unconstitutional
because it relieves the state of its burden of persuasion to prove
the element of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.1 28
Even if House Bill 536's presumptions were construed to create
permissive inferences, 129 they remain constitutionally questionable.
It is well settled that a permissive inference must be judged in
light of the circumstances giving rise to that inference.130 A permis-
sive inference will be upheld only if it is show that it is "more
likely than not" that the presumed fact flows from the proved
fact. 1 31 In the midst of heavy drug use, it is unlikely that a preg-
123. Staff Analysis, supra note 113 at 3.
124. Fla. HB 536 (1987).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. In Miller v. Norvell, 775 F.2d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1985), the court held that the
phrase "shall constitute prima facie evidence" as used in an embezzlement statute, created a
mandatory rebuttable presumption.
128. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985).
129. Permissive inferences serve the purpose of directing the jury's attention to infer-
ences it might draw and thus tend to encourage particular conclusions. Ulster County Court
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 170 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 162-63.
131. Id. at 165. Where the proved fact is the sole evidence of the presumed fact, the
presumed fact must flow from the proven fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 167.
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nant drug addict is capable of appreciating risk posed to her un-
born child, or even to herself. Indeed, individuals who are, for ex-
ample, physically addicted to heroin or deeply psychologically
dependent on cocaine, may be so obsessed by their cravings for
drugs that they are subjectively oblivious to other considerations
such as the adverse consequences of their conduct for themselves
and others. Consequently, it is unclear whether it is more likely
than not that the presumed element of knowledge flows from the
proven fact of harm suffered by the child. Thus House Bill 536's
statutory presumptions were probably unconstitutional even if
viewed as permissive inferences.
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Committee Substitute for House Bill 155 is
clearly a step forward in Florida's efforts to protect the quality of
life for children born to drug dependent mothers. In preparing this
legislation, Florida's lawmakers succeeded in protecting the child's
welfare without unduly infringing the mother's right to privacy.
Unfortunately, while the legislation may improve the quality of life
for some of Florida's children, there is still no protection for in-
fants born suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome or legal drug tox-
icity. The legislature wisely declined to provide for the criminal
prosecution of women who give birth to drug dependent children;
House Bill 536 violated Florida's policy of preserving the family by
authorizing criminal prosecutions of such mothers, even if one as-
sumes its constitutionality. Hopefully Florida's legislators will seri-
ously consider the negative impact of such an approach if it is pro-
posed in the future.
